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RESUMEN
Este es un estudio histórico-institucional acerca del sistema de comisiones
parlamentarias del Congreso chileno desde 1834 a 1924. Usando una perspectiva
longitudinal para centrarse en los orígenes, funciones, procesos y autoridad de
dichas comisiones, este artículo muestra que el Congreso chileno desarrolló un
sistema de comisiones tempranamente, a partir de experiencias previas y de
experimentación. En este sistema las comisiones redactaban leyes, se encargaban
de asuntos internos y fiscalizaban la burocracia con resultados variados. Los
líderes del Congreso tenían a su cargo la conformación de la comisiones, para lo
cual se apoyaban en la mayoría parlamentaria y la persuasión. A pesar del impacto
del diseño institucional sobre el desempeño de las comisiones, la evidencia
muestra que estas se desempeñaron como agencias especializadas y autoritativas
aun antes del surgimiento de los partidos políticos modernos, a fines de la década
de 1850.
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ABSTRACT
This is a historical, institutional study about the congressional committee system
of the Chilean legislature from 1834 through 1924. This study uses a longitudinal
perspective to focus on committee origins, functions, processes, and authority. It
shows that the Chilean legislature developed a committee system early by taking
stock of previous, short-lived congressional experiences and trial-and-error.
Congressional committees dealt with bill drafting, housekeeping matters, and
bureaucratic oversight therein with varying results. Congressional leaders presided
over the committee appointment process by relying on majority support and
* Ph.D., M.A. State University of New York at Albany; LL.B. Pontificia Universidad Católica de
Valparaíso (Chile). Assistant Professor of Law at Universidad de Talca. Email: iobandoc@utalca.cl.
The author thanks the comments made to an early version of this article by Professors Patricio
Carvajal Aravena and Alan Bronfman Vargas. The author bears exclusive responsibility for any
mistake.
** Abreviatures: SCL: Sesiones de los Cuerpos Legislativos; SCN: Sesiones del Congreso
Nacional; SCD: Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados; SCS: Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores; Ord.:
Sesión Ordinaria; Ext.: Sesión Extraordinaria; Reglamento (1831): 1831 Reglamento Interior de la
Cámara de Diputados; Reglamento (1840): 1840 Reglamento del Senado; Reglamento (1846): 1846
Reglamento Interior de la Cámara de Diputados.
166 HISTORIA 44 / 2011
persuasion. The impact of institutional design on committee performance,
notwithstanding, the evidence shows that committees performed as specialized,
authoritative agencies even before the emergence of modern political parties in the
late 1850s.
Key words: legislature, committees, committee referral, authority.
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INTRODUCTION
Committees play a policy-making and socialization role in the legislative
process of Western democracies. Wilson thus pointed out early to the importance
of committees for congressional work and members’ goals1, while Fenno addressed
the role of congressional committees in a study of half-a-dozen House
committees2.
The study of Third World legislatures seldom focuses on committees. In a
review of this research field, Mezey concluded that it focuses mostly on the
relationship between the legislature and the external environment3. The same focus
characterizes the study of the Chilean legislature that functioned from 1834 to
1924. Thus, Reinsch pointed out to the aristocratic origins of this legislature4; Gil
stressed the independence acquired by this legislature during the Parliamentary
Republic5; Valenzuela and Wilde focused on the role performed by this legislature
in the democratization of the Chilean polity6, while Heise highlighted the role
played by parliamentary politics in Chilean democratic development7.
Unfortunately, scholars have rarely studied the congressional committee system
of this legislature. Besides Valencia’s thorough compilation of committee
1 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics, Baltimore, The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, 58-59, 145.
2 Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees, Boston, Little, Brown and Company,
1973, xiv-xvi.
3 Michael Mezey, “Third World Legislatures”, in Handbook of Legislative Studies, edited by
Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson, and Malcolm E. Jewell, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1985, 766.
4 Paul S. Reinsch, “Parliamentary Government in Chile”, The American Political Science
Review 3:4, 1909, 509-510.
5 Federico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966,
117-119.
6 Arturo Valenzuela and Alexander Wilde, “Presidential Politics and the Decline of the Chilean
Congress”, in Legislatures and Political Development, edited by Joel Smith and Lloyd D. Musolf,
Durham, Duke University Press, 1979, 192-195.
7 Julio Heise González, Historia de Chile: El Período Parlamentario, 1861-1925, Vol. I,
Santiago, Editorial Andrés Bello, 1974; Julio Heise González, El Período Parlamentario, 1861-1925:
Democracia y Gobierno Representativo en el Período Parlamentario (Historia del Poder Electoral),
Vol. II, Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1982.
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membership8, there is only a couple of studies that provide a snapshot into Chilean
committee history written by upper-level law students9, but hardly some
scholarship about committee origins, functions, processes, and authority in this
legislature. These questions about institutional history of congressional committees
have largely gone unanswered so far, impairing thus a thorough understanding of
Chilean congressional institutions from a historical, institutional perspective.
On this vein, this article shows that the Chilean legislature developed a
congressional committee system by taking stock of previous, short-lived
congressional experiences and trial-and-error experiences. This committee system
consisted of standing and select committees at first, but congressional leaders
expanded it to encompass joint committees and subcommittees later. This
committee system remained untouched until the late nineteenth century, so it
became the backbone of new committees by the turn of the century. Likewise, the
evidence shows that committees socialized their members to handle variegated
inputs, such as the drafting of legislation and resolutions, congressional
housekeeping matters, and congressional oversight. By the same token, the data
reveals that the House Speaker and the Senate President presided over the
committee appointment process by relying both on majority support and persuasion
most of the time, instead of outright coercion. Nevertheless, the dynamics of
committee referral diverged in both houses due to the different role of committees
therein. The House made committee referral mandatory from the start, while the
Senate suppressed it in 1840. The latter impacted negatively the Senate committee
workload until the late nineteenth century, as measured by the number of Senate
committee reports. Besides collective action problems that affected congressional
committee activity, committee chairs had considerable leeway to keep legislation
in the committee dockets, so minority-supported legislation either died or lagged in
committees. The latter implies that committees performed as specialized,
authoritative agencies in the legislative process. Interestingly enough, committees
emerged as such agencies before the emergence of modern political parties in the
late 1850s, so a committee institutionalization process was under way even under
the autocratic, Conservative Republic that lasted until 1861. In so doing, the
institutionalization of Chilean congressional committees largely preceded similar
processes that took place elsewhere later, as patterns of committee behavior and
norms achieved stability, permanency, and self-sustaining status during the period
of time analyzed herein10.
This research is based on evidence collected basically from primary,
congressional data sources given the lack of secondary sources on this subject. The
8 Luis Valencia Avaria (comp.), Anales de la República, Tomo II, Santiago, Editorial Andrés
Bello, 1986, 128-472.
9 Carlos Andrade Geywitz, Las Comisiones Parlamentarias en la Cámara de Diputados
(Desarrollo Histórico y Régimen Actual), Santiago, Universidad de Chile, 1945; Ingrid Ahumada
Muñoz, Las Comisiones Parlamentarias en Chile y otros Países, Santiago, Editorial Jurídica, 1967.
10 Iván Mauricio Obando Camino, Legislative Institutionalization in Chile, 1834-1924, Albany,
State University of New York at Albany, 2009, 21, 405, 423.
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field work was conducted at Chile’s Library of Congress and National Library, in
Santiago de Chile, from November 2006 through June 2008, wherein I collected
data from congressional journals and documentation. Although unexpected matters
impeded to complete the time-series of Table 2, the data collected up till then was
comprehensive enough of major periods of Chilean political and congressional
history, which advised limiting the data analysis to the time-periods effectively
reported therein, as follows: 1834-1905 (both houses), 1906 (House), 1909-1913
(House), and 1918-1920 (House). The length of these time-periods allowed making
valid inferences about Chilean legislative development over time, as they show
secular trends about committee workload11.
This article consists of two sections, besides this introduction and conclusions.
The first section provides a brief, historical introduction to the Chilean legislature
and the early congressional committee system, as well as a thorough analysis of the
different committees that made up the congressional committee system from 1834
through 1924. The second section focuses on committee processes and authority,
for which purpose it analyzes both the appointment process and the referral
process, and the authority exerted by committees in the legislative process.
THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE SYSTEM: COMMITTEE TYPES AND FUNCTIONS
The Chilean legislature and the early congressional committee system
The 1833 Constitution kept the bicameral legislature created by the 1828
Constitution. Congress shared in legislative initiative with the president, but the
latter could restrain Congress through extraordinary prerogatives that could turn
him into a republican dictator12. However, the Grand Convention made sure that
the president ruled with the advice of Congress by making mandatory the annual
approval of the investment of public funds, the budget law, the authorization of the
permanent ground and naval forces, the authorization to station permanent troops
where Congress was in session and up to two-and-a-half miles, and the
authorization to impose or suppress taxes every eighteen months. Likewise,
Congress could impeach cabinet members, generals, admirals, high executive
appointees, and members of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in case of
constitutional or legal transgressions, embezzlement, treason, extortion, and other
ethical wrongdoings.
Needless to say, this constitution provided the legal framework for uninterrupted,
aristocratic civilian government in Chile. The first three presidents elected after 1831
remained in office for a decade. They inaugurated the autocratic, Conservative
Republic that consolidated the nation-state and government viability. A new Liberal
11 Idem.
12 José Victorino Lastarria, Estudios Políticos i Constitucionales, Vol. I, Santiago, Imprenta,
Litografía i Encuadernacion Barcelona, 1906, 330-331; Luis Galdames, Evolución Constitucional de
Chile, Tomo I, Santiago, Balcells & Co., 1925, 939; Gil, op. cit.
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Republic developed from 1861 to 1891, in which prohibition of presidential
reelection in 1871 and congressional policy-making became major staples of this
regime. Congressional victory over the presidency in the 1891 Civil War inaugurated
the Parliamentary Republic. From 1891 to 1925 Congress shifted the policy-making
authority to the legislature, while parties took electoral authority away from the
presidency once electoral liberty became ingrained in the Chilean polity.
Chilean legislatures had committees since 181113, but their short-lived
existence renders these committees an anecdotal episode. Later, each house of the
Liberal Congress elected in 1828 created standing committees, after a favourable
evaluation of the committees created that year by the General Constitutional
Congress. These committees remained on the paper after the Conservative take
over of 1831, which signalled the end of the 1828 Constitution. Nevertheless, the
House Standing Orders of 1831 remained into effect for another decade-and-a-half,
so both houses kept working according to these standing orders under the newly
enacted 1833 Constitution, though the Senate reduced its standing committees
from ten to six in 1834-183514.
The House Standing Orders of 1831 created ten standing committees, while
authorized the House Speaker to appoint select committees as the floor saw fit.
Eventually, both houses’ standing committees ebbed and flowed until the Senate
passed its standing orders in 1840 and the House of Deputies passed its in 1846,
drafted after the Senate’s. In so doing, both houses streamlined their committee
organization and processes, which had lasting effects thereafter as shown below.
The standing committees
The House Standing Orders of 1831 set the number of standing committees in
ten, each of which had from five to seven members at least, except the Committee
on Internal Police that consisted only of the Speaker, the Vice-Speaker, and the
House Secretary. These standing committees were, as follows: Elections;
Constitution; Legislation and Justice; Government and Foreign Affairs; Treasure,
Agriculture, Commerce, Arts, and Mining; War and Navy; Education and Welfare;
Ecclesiastical Affairs; Qualification of Petitions, and Internal Police15. Most of
them remained in place until 1846.
13 Ahumada, op. cit.
14 SCD 1 Ord. (6/6/1834), in SCL 22: 285. The House of Deputies re-enacted the standing orders
passed by the Federal Congress of 1826, whereas a select committee drafted the first standing orders
in 1831. SCD Sesión Preparatoria 2da (5/28/1831), in SCL 20: 10; SCD 3 Ord. (6/3/1831), in SCL 20:
40; SCD 8 Ord. (6/14/1831), in SCL 20: 73-74; SCD 9 Ord. (6/15/1831), in SCL 20: 75-76; SCD 10
Ord. (6/17/1831), in SCL 20: 77-78; SCD 11 Ord. (6/18/1831), in SCL 20: 79-80; SCD 12 Ord. (6/12/
1831), in SCL 20: 81-82; SCD 13 Ord. (6/21/1831), in SCL 20: 83-84; SCD 14 Ord. (6/22/1831), in
SCL 20: 88; SCD 16 Ord. (6/24/1831), in SCL 20: 93-94; SCD 17 Ord. (6/27/1831), in SCL 20: 95-97;
SCD 18 Ord. (6/28/1831), in SCL 20: 97-98; SCD 19 Ord. (6/30.1831), in SCL 20: 100-101; SCD 20
Ord. (7/1/1831), in SCL 20: 103-104; SCD 21 Ord. (7/21831), in SCL 20: 105-106; SCD 22 Ord. (7/4/
1831), in SCL 20: 107-108; SCD 23 Ord. (7/5/1831), in SCL 20: 109-111; SCD 24 (7/6/1831), in SCL
20: 112; SCD 26 Ord. (7/8/1831), in SCL 20: 116-117; SCD 27 Ord. (7/9/1831), in SCL 20: 118-120;
SCS 3 (6/9/1834), in SCL 23: 36-37; SCS 14 (7/9/1834), in SCL 23: 109-110.
15 Reglamento (1831): Articles 27-28.
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The House Standing Orders of 1846 reformed the committee system created
back in 1831 and set the number of standing committees in eight. Like their
predecessors, these committees reflected the organization and mission of the
bureaucracy. They remained in place for the next fifty years and kept the same
number of members as before. This reform also effected changes in committee
jurisdiction, as follows: Elections and Petitions; Constitution, Legislation, and
Justice; Government and Foreign Affairs; Treasure and Industry; War and Navy;
Education and Welfare; Ecclesiastical Affairs; and Internal Police16.
One problem that plagued House standing committees was that there were
members that lacked committee membership, since the House Standing Orders of
1846 regulated a house smaller than the one that came into being years later. The
latter drove the House Speaker to modify committee membership sometimes to
allow more participation. In 1870 the House raised the number of committee
members from six to seven members, except the Committee on Internal Police
which consisted of five members. However, resentment among members excluded
from standing committees –usually from the Conservative opposition, hardened in
the 1880s, which persuaded to raise the number of committee members to eleven in
188517.
In 1897 the House Committee on Government and Foreign Affairs split in two
new committees, after the creation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1871.
These committees were Government and Foreign Affairs, the latter consisting of
seven members.
In 1901 the House passed a regulatory reform to create new standing
committees and change committee jurisdiction. This reform increased the number
of standing committees to eleven: Elections; Government; Foreign Affairs;
Welfare and Cult; Legislation and Justice; Public Instruction; Treasure; War and
Navy; Industry; Public Works; and Internal Police. This reform also shifted
petitions of private persons from a standing committee to a select committee, in
accordance with the September 10th, 1887 Act18.
The House vested authority upon the Committee on Government to deal with
the colonization of inland territories in 1906 and created a Committee on Social
Legislation to deal with industrial relations in 1912, pushing up the number of
standing committees to twelve. Other standing committees met jurisdictional
changes as well: colonization changed from the Committee on Government to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs; the Committee on Welfare and Cult became the
Committee on Public Assistance and Cult; and the Committee on Industry became
the Committee on Industry and Agriculture, which provided the agricultural lobby
with privileged access to the legislative process.
16 Reglamento (1846): Article 33.
17 In 1870 the House set the number of committee members from six to seven members, except
the Committee on Internal Police which consisted of five members. SCD 2 Ord. (6/6/1876): 23; SCD 3
Ord. (6/5/1885): 29; SCD 2 Ord. (6/5/1888): 33-34.
18 September 10th, 1887 Act: Article 4º, in Ricardo Anguita (comp.), Leyes Promulgadas en
Chile, Santiago, Imprenta, Litografia i Encuadernacion Barcelona, 1912-1918, Vol. III: 38.
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In 1918 the number of standing committees increased to thirteen, when the
House created a Committee on Budget19. Finally, the House created a fourteenth
standing committee in 1924: the Committee on Bill Drafting Style.
The Senate Standing Orders of 1840 set the number of standing committees in
seven, each of which had either two or three members, except the Committee on
Internal Police that consisted only of the President, the Vice-President, and the
Senate Secretary. These standing orders stabilized the number of standing
committees for the next fifty-six years, though the Senate President did not appoint
members to the Committee on Ecclesiastical Affairs from 1885 through 1888.
These standing committees were, as follows: Constitution, Legislation, and Justice;
Government and Foreign Affairs; Treasure and Industry; War and Navy; Education
and Welfare; Ecclesiastical Affairs; and Internal Police20.
Like in the House, the jurisdiction of several of these committees reflected the
three traditional ministries that dated back to the 1820s, which jurisdiction
encompassed broad policy areas according to their by-laws, e.g. Interior and
Foreign Affairs, War and Navy, and Treasure. The only standing committee which
jurisdiction did not reflect bureaucratic goals was the Senate Committee on
Internal Police, which dealt with housekeeping matters.
The Senate Standing Committee on Government and Foreign Affairs also split
in two new committees in 1897: Government and Foreign Affairs, respectively.
This reform brought the number of standing committees back to seven again, as the
Senate stopped appointing members to the Committee on Ecclesiastical Affairs
after 189121.
In 1900 the Senate passed a regulatory reform that increased the number of
standing committees to ten. The new committees dealt with new issues and
agencies: Cult and Colonization; Public Instruction; Budget; and Public Works.
Their jurisdiction changed later, but their number remained steady, e.g. industry
shifted from the Committee on Treasure to the Committee on Public Works in
1907.
New Senate Standing Orders enacted in 1917 reformed extensively the
jurisdiction of standing committees. New committees dealt with pressing policy
issues: Government and Elections; Foreign Affairs and Cult; Public Works and
Colonization; Legislation and Justice; Treasure and Municipal Loans; and
Agriculture, Industry, and Railways. Committee membership grew to five
members per committee by now. Finally, the Senate created a short-lived
Committee on Bill Drafting Style in 1924, which raised the number of standing
committees to eleven.
Last but not least, both houses’ standing orders also authorized the appointment
of joint standing committees of a single house to draft legislation, albeit it seems
19 The Committee on Budget dealt with bills that supplemented funds to the budget law. Deputy
Ramírez requested the creation of this committee in late 1913. SCD 13 Ext. (11/15/1913): 284.
20 Reglamento (1840): Article 35.
21 SCS 16 Ord. (7/12/1897): 284-286.
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that select committees and joint select committees displaced them in parliamentary
practice by the 1850s22.
Looking back into the development of both houses’ standing committees, both
houses increased their number in response to bureaucratic changes, a growing
scope of government activities, and new policy issues that appealed both to the
government and law-makers by the turn of the century, e.g. colonization, social
legislation, hygiene, railways, etc.
Table 1 provides data on the number of both houses’ standing committees from
1834 through 1924. These data allow a longitudinal, historical view about the
development of these committees. This table shows that the number of standing
committees remained relatively steady in both houses after the 1840s. The number
of Senate standing committees suffered a sudden drop in 1837, after which it went
up in 1839. This drop took place in the heyday of the war against the Peruvian-
Bolivian Confederation, just as the Senate voted to resume military operations.
Senate standing committees returned to their pre-war number two years later, after
Chile’s military victory, which suggests that the war effort disrupted the activity of
Senate standing committees in 1837 and 1838. The number of Senate standing
committees went down again from 1891 to 1896, as the Senate stopped appointing
members to the Committee on Ecclesiastical Affairs, after which it was replaced by
a newly created Committee on Foreign Affairs. The number of House standing
committees, in turn, experienced a downward trend before 1846 and an upward
trend in the late 1890s. Indeed, the House locked-in into the standing committee
system created by the House Standing Orders of 1831 until the early 1840s, even
though it might not have satisfied work requirements. More likely than not, trial
and error, as well as adjustment, presided over the varying number of standing
committees that existed until 1846, just as some old standing committees merged
with others, e.g. the Elections and Petitions committees, whereas others simply
ceased into existence, e.g. the Committee on Constitution. The upward trend of the
late 1890s reveals a more responsive House regarding newly mobilized social
groups and changes in the national bureaucracy, e.g. the creation of new ministries
and agencies.
22 Reglamento (1840): Article 37; Reglamento (1846): Article 34. A case in point was the Joint
Committee on Treasure and Legislation that drafted the Mining Engineers Corp Bill in the early 1880s.
SCD 35 Ord. (9/15/1853), Report of the House Joint Committee on Treasure and Legislation about the
Corp of Mining Engineers Bill.
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TABLE 1
Standing committees in the Chilean Congress
Year House Senate
1834 10 6
1835 10 6
1836 10 6
1837 10 4
1838 …. ….
1839 10 6
1840 9 6
1841 9 7
1842 9 7
1843 8 7
1844 7 7
1845 7 7
1846 8 7
1847 8 7
1848 8 7
1849 8 7
1850 8 7
1851 8 7
1852 8 7
1853 8 7
1854 8 7
1855 8 7
1856 8 7
1857 8 7
1858 8 7
1859 8 7
1860 8 7
1861 8 7
1862 8 7
1863 8 7
1864 8 7
Source: Author’s creation from Valencia, op. cit.
Year House Senate Year House Senate
1865 8 7
1866 8 7
1867 8 7
1868 8 7
1869 8 7
1870 8 7
1871 8 7
1872 8 7
1873 8 7
1874 8 7
1875 8 7
1876 8 7
1877 8 7
1878 8 7
1879 8 7
1880 8 7
1881 8 7
1882 8 7
1883 8 7
1884 8 7
1885 8 7
1886 8 7
1887 8 7
1888 8 7
1889 8 7
1890 8 7
1891 8 6
1892 8 6
1893 8 6
1894 8 6
1895 8 6
1896 8 6
1897 9 7
1898 9 7
1899 9 7
1900 9 10
1901 11 10
1902 11 10
1903 11 10
1904 11 10
1905 11 10
1906 11 10
1907 11 10
1908 11 10
1909 11 10
1910 11 10
1911 11 10
1912 12 10
1913 12 10
1914 12 10
1915 12 10
1916 12 10
1917 12 10
1918 13 10
1919 13 10
1920 13 10
1921 13 10
1922 13 10
1923 13 10
1924 14 11
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The select committees
Both houses’ standing orders authorized the appointment of select committees
to deal with any type of business pending before the floor23. Membership in select
committees ranged from a minimum of two members to more than a dozen of
members, depending on the complexity of issues and the criteria of the nominating
agents, e. g. representativeness, majority veto, expertise, leaders’ commitment, etc.
Select committees normally ceased into existence once they reported to the floor.
Sometimes select committees performed better than standing committees,
especially if the absence of one or more members prevented a standing committee
to meet at all. Nevertheless, select committees failed to report to the floor often,
probably because of the circumstances surrounding their appointment. Besides
multiple committee appointments of members and distractions arising from
members’ economic occupations, it is surmised that referral of legislation to select
committees might have been a means to by-pass standing committees, so that
disfavoured legislation lagged or died in a select committee24. As a matter of fact,
on November 11th, 1878 Deputy Allende found out that a House select committee
appointed to draft legislation based on his plan for general vaccination –instead of
the House Standing Committee on Education and Welfare, failed to meet at all,
because several of committee members believed– out of religious reasons, that
“forced vaccination was an attack against individual freedom”25. Deputy Allende
did not protest; instead, he accepted the committee members’ suggestion to have
his plan implemented only in public schools, jails, and military barracks, after
which the committee reported on his bill project soon26.
Though select committees -like all other committees, did not have a final,
decisional authority, there was a committee that had this type of authority: the
House Committee on Order of Legislative Business (Comisión de Tabla). The
House created this committee on September 15th, 1870 to schedule the businesses
of the floor because members were tired of endless debates about bill scheduling,
for which purpose they granted upon it a final, decisional authority. The House
agreed on the definite membership of this committee on June 5th, 1885, as follows:
the House Speaker, the House Vice-Speakers, and the standing committee chairs.
Notwithstanding the authority of this committee, House Speaker Valdés clarified
that members could amend the bill schedule by absolute plurality in 190427.
A cursory review of congressional journals shows that both houses appointed
select committees often, even for purposes other than law-making. Select
23 Reglamento (1840): Article 37; Reglamento (1831): Article 29; Reglamento (1846): Article 34.
24 Something like this might have happened in the 1870s with the vaccination bills. The House
referred two different plans for general vaccination of the population to select committees instead of
the more appropriate Standing Committee on Education and Welfare, which dealt precisely with health
and medical facilities, where they stalled because of the opposition of the Catholic Church.
25 SCD 18 Ext. (11/2/1878): 173.
26 SCD 32 Ext. (11/28/1878): 331.
27 Ismael Valdés Valdés, Prácticas Parlamentarias: Cámara de Diputados i Senado, 2nd ed.,
Santiago, Sociedad Imprenta-Litografía Barcelona, 1918, 80-82.
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committees drafted relevant legislation, even during the congressional recess
once28; reported on consultations referred by their houses29; handled specific tasks
for their houses30, and even upheld legislation before the other house31. Indeed, the
House Standing Orders of 1831, the Senate Standing Orders of 1840, and the
House Standing Orders of 1846 authorized the other house’s committees to uphold
legislation on the floor32, so a widely accepted parliamentary practice developed in
the legislature, as House Speaker García de la Huerta confirmed it to a fellow
member: “There is no danger, Mr. Deputy: the parliamentary practices authorize
that procedure that has been used in other occasions”33. Furthermore, select
committees collected information about election frauds, impeachment charges,
foreign policy, and misadministration cases too34, performing thus a semi-
administrative or semi-judicial function35.
There was also a temporary committee that verified the legality of House
elections. This committee was the House Committee on Qualification of Electoral
Mandates (Comisión Calificadora de Poderes), which reported about the legality
of the election documents exhibited by newly elected members36. This committee
dated back to 1828, though like committees existed before in several short-lived,
unicameral legislatures too. A regulatory reform passed on January 10th, 1885
28 See, among others, SCS 3 Ext. (10/6/1848), Report of the Senate Select Committee on
Primogeniture States; SCS (7/18/1851), Report of the Senate Select Committee on Municipal
Legislation; SCS 3 Ord. (6/18/1860); SCS 26 Ext. (11/11/1874), Report of the Senate Select
Committee on the Mining Law Code; SCD 22 Ext. (10/17/1874), Report of the House Select
Committee on the Mining Law Code; SCD 17 Ord. (7/13/1875), Report of the House Select Committee
on Criminality; SCD 40 Ord. (9/12/1877); SCD 32 Ext. (11/28/1878), Report of the House Select
Committee on the General Vaccination Law; SCD 61 Ext. (1/14/1878), and SCD 18 Ord. (7/9/1878),
Report of the House Select Committee on Treasure.
29 See, among others, SCS 2 Ord. (6/6/1870); SCD 17 Ord. (7/6/1878), Report of the House
Committee on the Education Bill.
30 Roldán reported that both houses appointed committees to draft a response to the annual
presidential address from 1842 to 1847, though the House kept appointing them until 1852. They
appointed new committees for the last time in 1863. Alcibiades Roldán Álvarez, Elementos de
Derecho Constitucional de Chile, Santiago, Imprenta Laguna, 1924, 270-272. See, among others, SCS
(11/26/1848), Report of the Senate Select Committee on Archives; SCD 46 Ord. (9/16/1870), Report
of the House Select Committee on Order of Legislative Business; SCS 2 Ord. (6/5/1878), Report of the
Senate Select Committee on Backlog; SCD 19 Ord. (7/11/1878), and SCD 20 Ord. (7/13/1878), Report
of the House Select Committee on the Preference Order of Private Bills.
31 The House appointed committees to uphold before the Senate the Individual Guarantees Bill
in 1875 and the Abolition of the Tobacco Monopoly Bill in 1879. SCD 9 Ext.
(11/3/1877); SCD 49 (9/6/1879).
32 Reglamento (1840): Article 65; Reglamento (1831): Article 94; Reglamento (1846): Article 103.
33 SCD 49 (9/6/1879): 537.
34 See, among others, SCS (8/26/1853), Report of the Senate Select Committee on Sequestration
of Foreign Property; SCD 1 Ext. (10/27/1863), Report of the House Select Investigative Committee on
Electoral Irregularities in Petorca; SCD 26 Ext. (4/28/1864), Reports of the Select Committees on
Accusations against the Intendants of Colchagua and Aconcagua; SCD 10 Ord. (7/1/1876), Report of
the House Select Committee on Elections about the Annulment of Elections; SCD 21 Ext. (11/28/
1893), Report of the House Investigative Committee about the Inspection of Lands and Colonization,
and SCD 16 Ord. (8/17/1895), Report of the House Select Investigative Committee about Railways.
35 Valdés, op. cit.
36 Reglamento (1846): Article 4.
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substituted five temporary, five-member election committees for the House
Committee on Qualification of Electoral Mandates, just like in Britain’s House of
Commons since 177037. These five committees reported about the legality of
election documents of newly elected members to the floor at the first ordinary
session, but whereas four of these committees dealt with electoral complaints on
contested House elections, the other one dealt with uncontested House elections38.
The Senate did not have a Committee on Qualification of Electoral Mandates
until the 1876 election, even though it appointed a like committee in 1828, 1831,
and 1833. The 1876 election was the first one after a constitutional reform made
senators directly elected by the people at the provinces. Traditionally, the Senate
qualified the elections of would-be members in a preparatory session before 1874,
but the qualification of electors was in the hands of municipal committees (juntas)
until the 1873 election39. The new 1874 Election Law prescribed that a
congressional committee decided about the annulment of House or Senate
elections; subsequently, the Senate appointed a Committee on Qualification of
Electoral Mandates on May 30th, 1876, which reported to the floor at the first
ordinary session, notwithstanding the silence of the Senate Standing Orders40.
Interestingly enough, the Senate President followed the same appointment process
used for standing committees41. A regulatory reform passed on January 22nd, 1906
substituted three temporary, five-member election committees for the Senate
Committee on Qualification of Electoral Mandates. These three committees
qualified the mandates of newly elected senators at the first ordinary session too42.
Although the constitution discarded conference committees, both houses
appointed joint select committees (comisiones mixtas) early based on their
regulatory authorization to appoint select committees43. These bicameral
committees drafted legislation44; handled congressional housekeeping matters45;
37 Spencer Walpole, The Electorate and the Legislature, London, Macmillan and Co., 1881, 85.
38 SCS 22 Ext. (1/14/1885): 341.
39 Senator Larraín Moxó asked the Senate President to appoint a Committee on Qualification of
Electoral Mandates in the second ordinary session of 1858. Senate President Benavente replied that the
Senate was not directly elected by the towns, which decided the annulment of elections of Senate
electors. Though the Senate appointed a Committee on Qualification of Senate Elections, there is not
evidence that this committee ever reported to the floor. SCS 2 Ord. (6/4/1858): 13-15.
40 The Senate could appoint this committee more than once during a session, e.g. SCS 28 Ord.
(8/26/1894): 425.
41 SCS Sesión Preparatoria (5/30/1876): 1; SCS 1 Ord. (6/2/1876): 5-6, Report of the Senate
Committee of Electoral Mandates.
42 Valdés, op. cit.
43 Reglamento (1840): Article 37; Reglamento (1831): Article 29; Reglamento (1846): Art. 34.
44 See, among others, SCS 7 Ext. (12/22/1843), in SCL 33 and SCD 11 Ext. (12/22/43), in SCL
32, Reports on the Regime of Internal Administration Bill; SCD 7 Ord. (6/13/1849), Report on the
National University Wage Reduction Bill; SCS 13 Ext. (11/5/1873), Report on the Reorganization of
Administrative Offices Bill; SCS 27 Ext. (10/10/1873), Report on the Public Education Bill, and SCD
21 Ext. (11/6/1875), Report on the Election Law.
45 Both houses appointed a joint select committee on portraits of “public men” for the new building
of the National Congress in 1875-1876, integrated again in 1879 and a two-member joint select
committee on the appointment and demotion of the congressional staff in accordance with the Act N°
1,351, of 1900. SCS 8 Ord. (6/19/1876); SCD 2 Ord. (6/5/1879): 22-23; SCD 3 Ord. (6/7/1879): 34.
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reported on consultations46, and did fact-finding for their houses47. Interestingly
enough, lawmakers used joint select committees to introduce “risk control” in the
legislative process, as suggested by a comment from Senator and then Minister of
Interior José Victorino Lastarria, in 1876, as follows:
“The Senate seems to welcome the idea persuaded, just like me, that the experience is
demonstrating that the analysis of businesses of some extent, done by joint select com-
mittees, is much more complete, expeditious, and faster than the separate analysis done
by two different committees, one from each House”48.
Finally, Congress created some joint select committees by law to draft a Civil
Law Code and to examine re-printed editions of the 1833 Constitution49.
The Joint Committee on Budget and the subcommittees
There was also a very important bicameral committee: the Joint Committee on
Budget. Neither house’s standing orders mentioned this committee, but both
houses appointed it based –presumably, upon their regulatory authorization to
appoint select committees50.
This joint committee analyzed and drafted the budget bill, although both houses
used either the standing committee on treasure or select committees to deal with
this bill project in 1836, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1872, 1878, 1879, 1880, 1881, and
188251. Much earlier, the Joint Committee on Budget also dealt with the tax bill
and the public account of the investment of public funds, but parliamentary
practices drove both houses to handle the tax bill through the standing committees
on treasure and the public account of the investment of public funds through select
committees later52.
46 See SCD 30 Ord. (7/23/1868), Report of the Joint Select Committee on Secret Expenditures
for the War against Spain of 1868.
47 Both houses appointed a Committee on the State of Public Finances in 1876 to study the
public treasure and a $3,000,000 pesos internal loan requested by the government. The committee
reports superseded the work of the Joint Committee on Budget. SCS 28 (8/11/1876); SCS 3 Ext. (10/
23/1876); SCS 5 Ext. (10/27/1876); SCS 6 Ext. (10/30.1876); SCS 14 Ext. (11/16/1876); SCS 16 Ext.
(11/20/1876); SCS 35 (34) Ext. (1/8/1877).
48 SCD 2 Ext. (10/19/1876): 16.
49 The Committee on Legislation of the National Congress created on September 10th, 1840; the
Reviewing Junta of the Civil Law Code Project created on October 29th, 1841; the Joint Select
Committee on the Civil Law Code created on July 17th, 1845, and the Reviewing Committee on Re-
printed Editions of the Political Constitution of the State created on December 28th, 1844.
50 Reglamento (1840): Article 37; Reglamento (1831): Article 29; Reglamento (1846): Article 34.
51 SCD 33 Ord. (9/12/1836), in SCL 24: 304; SCS 31 Ord. (9/16/1836), in SCL 25: 208; SCD 27
Ord. (8/28/1839), in SCL 24: 617; SCS 19 Ord. (8/28/1839), in SCL 26: 374; SCS 28 Ord. (8/26/
1840), in SCL 28: 515; SCD 32 Ord. (8/28/1840), in SCL 27: 198; SCD 37 Ord. (9/10/1841), in SCL
30: 480; SCD 48 Ord. (10/19/1841), in SCL 30: 526; SCS 18 Ext. (10/27/1841), in SCL 29: 96; SCS 1
Ord. (6/3/1872): 5-8; SCS 16 Ord. (8/7/1878): 122-123; SCS 7 Ord. (6/23/1879): 43; SCS 18 Ord. (8/
7/1880): 157; SCS 6 Ext. (12/20/1880): 61; SCS 34 Ord. (8/24/1881): 367; SCS 2 Ext. (11/10/1882):
18. The government did not introduce a budget bill into Congress in 1837 and 1838, because Chile was
at war with the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation.
52 SCD 32 Ord. (9/6/1853), Report of the Joint Committee on Budget about the Tax Bill; SCD 27
Ord. (9/14/1872), Report of the House Select Committee on the 1869 Investment Account.
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The committee reported on the budget bill to any house floor until 1849, but
this practice changed in 1850, when the government introduced the budget bill into
Congress through the Senate for the first time. The Senate dealt with the committee
report -and passed the budget bill, before the House from then on53.
The committee issued one report on the budget bill at first. The growing
complexity of the public finances and the convenience of giving a say to more
members about the budget bill advised committee members to issue more than one
report later, for which purpose they created as many joint subcommittees as the
number of ministries funded by the budget bill, each of which reported about the
ministry under its purview.
The September 26th, 1884 Act wrote into the law the Joint Committee on
Budget54. This act dealt with the drafting of the budget and the account of the
investment of public funds, making mandatory the referral of both bills to this
committee55. In 1912 Congress passed Act N° 2,672 that streamlined the
committee process to reach a balanced budget56.
Finally, congressional journals are almost silent about the appointment of
subcommittees, other than the Joint Committee on Budget’s. Nevertheless,
congressional journals show that select committees appointed subcommittees to
fulfil their mission sometimes, e.g. the Joint Committee on the State of Public
Finances of 1876, the House Select Committee on Treasure of 1877-187857.
COMMITTEE PROCESSES AND AUTHORITY
The committee appointment process
The committee appointment process took place on a triennial basis after 1834,
with the exception of the annual appointment of Senate committees in 1837 and
183958. Usually, the House Speaker and the Senate President proposed the
membership of the standing committees to the floor at the first ordinary
session59. This process experienced a twist after 1878, because both houses
confirmed committee membership (either by not appointing members or by
53 The executive introduced the budget bill into Congress through the House in early June 1892,
but the House voted to forward the bill to the Senate “in accordance with parliamentary practices and
the Standing Orders”. SCD 3 Ord. (6/14/1892): 22
54 September 26th, 1884 Act, in Anguita, op. cit, Vol. III.
55 Senator Lamas introduced a bill to substitute the standing committees of both houses for the
Joint Committee on Budget in 1896, but Congress never passed this bill. SCS 19 Ext. (12/24/1896):
294-296.
56 Act Nº 2,672, in Anguita, op. cit., Vol. IV: 437.
57 SCS 34 Ord. (8/28/1876): 359; SCD 16 Ord. (7/4/1878), Report of the House Select
Committee on Treasure; SCD 21 Ord. (7/16/1878): 316.
58 Because of the War against the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, the Senate did not appoint
committees in 1838.
59 Reglamento (1840): Article 11 Paragraph 8.º; Reglamento (1831): Article 22 Paragraph 7.º;
Reglamento (1846): Article 28 Paragraph 8.º
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integrating committees) or appointed committees sometimes. The latter suggests
that a negotiation process took place in advance before the inauguration of
Congress’s ordinary sessions. This negotiation occurred among congressional
parties at first and among party caucuses later, just as political parties emerged in
the late 1860s.
The House Speaker and the Senate President could also propose the
appointment of members to more than one committee, although under some
limitations. The House Standing Orders did not authorize the appointment of
members to more than two committees, whereas the Senate’s were silent about this
matter60. Nevertheless, the House Speaker disregarded the standing orders
sometimes to please members, to surmount membership restrictions, and to
integrate committees that suddenly had one or more vacant seats during sessions.
It was not uncommon that members asked to have their names deleted from the
proposal on committee membership based on health or aged related reasons,
having an appointment in other committee, or simply lack of time. Members also
asked to shift their appointment to another committee more of their liking.
Members even asked being replaced by more knowledgeable or experienced
members, particularly in budgetary matters. These changes took place frequently in
the House not only because committee activity was a distinctive feature of the
House legislative process, but also because the House Standing Orders and
practices authorized to do so61.
It goes without saying that both houses could reject the proposal on committee
membership, but this was a rare event62. Indeed, the House Speaker and the Senate
President took great pains both to accommodate the policy interests of members
and to make their house a workable legislature. The latter drove them to go out
their way to persuade reluctant members sometimes, but they knew they could not
push members too far, because disgruntled members could fail deliberately to
attend committee sessions and cause bottlenecks in the legislative process (as they
did many times). In other words, dissent swelled the floor during the committee
appointment process sometimes, forcing thus leaders –and their supporting
majority, to come to terms with dissenting members. As a matter of fact, Deputies
Matta and Lastarria objected the unrepresentative composition of the House Select
Committee on Electoral Reform appointed in 1869, whereas Deputy Vicuña
objected the integration of the House Committee on Treasure with a member who
had interests in vineyards in 187463. All in all, the authority of the House Speaker
and the Senate President in the committee appointment process relied both on
majority support and persuasion, instead of outright coercion.
60 Reglamento (1831): Article 34; Reglamento (1846): Article 39.
61 Reglamento (1831): Articles 34-35; Reglamento (1846): Article 39.
62 House Speaker Toro had his proposal objected by the floor in 1900, especially by the
Conservative Party members. SCD 35 Ord. (8/6/1901): 429.
63 SCD 9 Ord. (6/24/69): 87; SCD 16 Ord. (7/9/1874): 210. In 1903 Senator Ballesteros objected
the underrepresentation of the Liberal Alliance in the Senate committees. SCS 17 Ord. (7/8/1903):
393-395.
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The burden of unpaid legislative service took its toll on the functioning of
committees often. Members who represented provincial districts could not stay
away from their offices, occupations, or homes for long time, especially if they
held government positions. Existing means of transportation also made difficult
to stay in touch with the districts. Thus, it was not a rare event that some
members stop attending committee sessions to run errands in their districts or to
attend their private occupations, so some committees failed to meet at some point
or another. To surmount these difficulties, both houses’ standing orders
authorized both to replace and to substitute members for the absentees64, a
practice known as integration of committees, with respect to which an early
House resolution stipulated that the House Speaker had absolute leeway to select
the nominee65.
The authority of the House Speaker in the committee appointment process
changed with respect to the House Committee on Qualification of Electoral
Mandates. The House Standing Orders of 1846 granted upon the House Speaker
exclusive authority to appoint the membership of this committee without a floor
vote, after each congressional election66. The extent of this exclusive authority was
contested once by opposition members, during the preparatory congressional
session held on May 29th, 1870. Needless to say, the majority sided with the
incumbent House Speaker, who fervently defended the exclusive authority vested
upon the office67. This exclusive authority persisted even after the regulatory
reform that substituted five temporary, five-member electoral committees for the
Committee on Qualification of Electoral Mandates in 188568.
Conversely, the Senate President lacked this exclusive authority to appoint the
membership of the Senate Committee on Qualification of Electoral Mandates from
1876 to 1903. The Senate President followed the standard committee appointment
process, that is, to propose the committee members to the floor at the first or
second preparatory session before ordinary sessions. The Senate President
followed this practice because the Senate Standing Orders of 1840 lacked any
provision about this committee, until a regulatory reform passed on January 22nd,
1906 granted upon the Senate President exclusive authority to appoint members to
three election committees created that year.
The standard appointment process applied to a great extent both to select
committees and the Joint Committee on Budget. Regarding the latter, the House
Speaker and the Senate President proposed to their floors the appointment of
members to different joint budget subcommittees69. According to parliamentary
64 Reglamento (1840): Article 11 Paragraph 8.º; Reglamento (1831): Article 22 Paragraph 7.º;
Reglamento (1846): Article 28 Paragraph 8.º
65 SCD 19 Ord. (7/13/1864): 272-273.
66 Reglamento (1846): Articles 4, 28 Paragraph 8.º
67 SCD (5/29/1870) Sesión Preparatoria: 2-4.
68 Reglamento (1846), 1885 version: Article 3, in SCS 22 Ext. (1/14/1885): 341.
69 Although congressional journals mentioned different “joint committees on budget” often,
these committees actually were subcommittees.
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practice, the Senate appointed its members to the Joint Committee on Budget first
from 1850 on. The House of Deputies appointed its members later, once it received
the Senate communication about the senators appointed to the committee.
Nevertheless, the Senate appointed a smaller number of members than the House,
based on its smaller membership size. House Secretary and Deputy Riesco
confirmed this practice on August 28th, 1877, when he asserted: “Mr. Riesco
(Secretary).- There has been a custom in this House to appoint to these Committees
twice as many members as the number appointed by the Senate”70.
The Senate deviated from this practice in 1897, after Senator Balmaceda
introduced a motion to invite the House to appoint five-member, select committees
from each house. The House replied by passing a resolution that stated that each
house could appoint the number of members that sees fit. Finally, the Senate
appointed the same number of members –eleven, to the Joint Committee on Budget
in 1903, after the House did not pay heed to a like request71.
The committee referral process
The role of committees in the legislative process differed somewhat in both
houses. The bigger House depended more on committees, so standing orders
reflected this phenomenon by regulating committee referral differently in the
1840s.
According to the House Standing Orders of 1831 –also used by the Senate after
1834, the House Speaker could refer a bill to a committee after the floor admitted
it to congressional debate by a one-third vote, but this roll-call could only take
place after two consecutive readings held in two different sessions by the House
Secretary72. The House Standing Orders of 1846 expedited committee referral by
authorizing the House Speaker to refer a bill to a committee after a second reading
-done in a second congressional session, by the House Secretary73. There was,
however, one way to circumvent the committee stage. Cabinet members frequently
asked the House Speaker to skip the second reading and the committee stage with
respect to money bills through a roll-call, because the House Standing Orders of
1846 allowed an absolute plurality to modify parliamentary procedures. Members
also asked the House Speaker to do likewise with respect to private bills,
especially as election times or congressional recess approached. Later, a House
resolution passed on June 7th, 1879 substituted the publication of a bill or petition
in the government gazette (Diario Oficial) for the second reading. Finally, the
House authorized the Speaker to refer bills to committees immediately after an
70 SCD 33 Ord. (8/28/1877): 446.
71 SCS 26 Ext. (1/11/1897): 479; SCD 54 Ord. (8/18/1897): 867; SCS 45 Ord. (8/27/1903): 876-
882, 888; SCS 49 Ord. (9/4/1903): 961; SCS 52 Ord. (9/11/1903): 1,038, 1,042; SCS 53 Ord. (9/14/
1903): 1,057. The Senate appointed two additional members to the Joint Committee on Budget on July
7th, 1902, which increased its representatives from six to eight members, to counterbalance the eight
House members appointed that year. SCS 16 Ord. (7/7/1902): 280.
72 Reglamento (1831): Articles 36-40.
73 Reglamento (1846): Article 55.
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account of their introduction (cuenta) to the floor by the House Secretary in 1904,
suppressing thus the two readings procedure74.
Petitions constituted a different matter for some time. The House Standing
Orders of 1831 did not have special regulations regarding petitions, so the same
committee referral rules applied both to petitions and bills. The House Standing
Orders of 1846 prescribed that the House Speaker could refer a petition to a
Committee on Petitions after the first reading by the House Secretary. This
committee reported whether or not the House had jurisdiction to deal with a
petition. The floor, in turn, voted on the committee report and, if the petition
consisted of a grace pension, on the merits of the petitioner. After the floor passed
a petition on both counts, the House Speaker referred it to another standing
committee75. Nonetheless, the 1904 reform ended up submitting petitions to the
same committee referral rules applicable to bills76.
This procedure changed in the Senate according to the Senate Standing Orders
of 1840, which suppressed mandatory committee referral. The referral of a newly
introduced bill or petition to a committee was conditional upon the fulfilment of
four requisites. First of all, the Senate Secretary had to read it twice in different
sessions, but the floor could skip the second reading by having a bill or petition
printed in the government gazette. Secondly, the floor had to admit a bill or
petition to congressional debate by casting only four votes, although both
government bills and House bills did not go through this admittance vote. Thirdly,
the general discussion of a bill or petition had to take place immediately after
being admitted to debate by the floor, albeit a resolution passed on July 28th, 1854
ruled that the discussion of petitions had to be secret. Fourthly, the floor had to
pass in general a bill or petition, after which it was scheduled for particular
discussion in another session, unless the floor directed the Senate President to refer
a bill or petition to a committee by simple plurality. Senate resolutions, in turn,
followed the same committee referral process, but they had one floor discussion
only; however, the floor could submit resolutions to the same number of
discussions of a bill by simple plurality77. A regulatory reform passed in 1897
authorized the Senate President to refer bill projects to committees immediately
after their second reading, if the floor voted to do so78. Summing up, contrarily to
the House, committee referral was not a frequent, parliamentary practice in the
Senate –presumably, due to collective action problems that aroused from a smaller
membership, until bigger legislative workload and membership changed somewhat
parliamentary practice by the turn of the century.
Besides standing committees, the House Speaker, the Senate President, and
members had a complete menu of committee choices. Members could propose
select committees, joint standing committees, and joint select committees to their
74 Reglamento (1846), 1904 version: Article 55.
75 Reglamento (1846): Articles 77-81.
76 Reglamento (1846), 1904 version: Articles 55, 77.
77 Reglamento (1840): Articles 78-86.
78 SCS 8 Ext. (10/26/1897): 221.
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leaders. Likewise, the House Speaker and the Senate President did not hesitate to
refer legislation and petitions to successive committees when there were issues that
could split a majority vote on them, e.g. private bills granting retirement benefits
to non-commissioned or commissioned army officers of Liberal leanings after the
1891 Civil War.
On this vein, Table 2 provides data on the number of committee reports issued
in both houses, including select committee reports. These data reveal secular trends
in committee workload under the dynamics of committee referral described above.
This table suggests that institutional design became a prime, causal factor that
impacted on both houses’ committee workloads, instead of the broad political
context having a differential impact on them. Indeed, a small Senate membership
that hampered committee activity persuaded Senate leaders to suppress mandatory
committee referral in 1840, affecting thus negatively committee workload. The
evidence shows that Senate committees issued fewer reports from 1834 to 1840,
which encompasses the heyday of the authoritarian, Conservative rule of President
General Prieto. Senate committees issued more reports in 1839, but this happened
after Congress resumed sessions in the aftermath of an external war. The 1839
surge died shortly, as committee reports did not reach the same numbers until
1893, after the suppression of mandatory committee referral in 1840. Thus, the
political context more amenable to legislative politics, inaugurated in late 1839,
did not have great impact on committee workload.
On the contrary, a bigger House membership affected positively committee
workload through mandatory committee referral from the start, though political
context had an impact in half of the time-series reported for the 1830s. House
committees issued fewer reports from 1834 to 1837, namely, during the heyday of
authoritarian rule, but they issued more reports from 1839 to 1844, which mostly
encompasses the first administration of Conservative President General Bulnes
(1840-1845), who liberalized authoritarian rule. Although the number of House
committee reports went down for two years in a row thereafter (1845, 1846), it was
still higher than in the mid-1830s. Last but not least, this table shows that the
number of House committee reports was on the rise most of the time after 1839
(75%), reaching still high numbers in 1845 and 1846.
The authority of congressional committees
After referral of a bill or petition to a committee, it was incumbent upon
committee members whether or not to report to the floor, so congressional leaders
lacked any means to take a bill or petition away from a committee.
The House Standing Orders prescribed that the House Speaker only could file the
necessary requests before a committee that delayed the dispatch of businesses, acting
upon the advice of House members79. Members interested in some piece of legislation,
then, addressed the House Speaker on the lack of committee activity at the beginning
79 Reglamento (1831): Article 33; Reglamento (1846): Article 40.
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of each congressional session, during the incidents hour (hora de incidentes), and
asked him to recommend committees to report on legislation promptly. The House
Speaker, in turn, recommended committee members to issue their report.
TABLE 2
House and Senate committee reports, 1834-1924
Source: Author’s creation from Valentín Letelier M. (comp.), Sesiones de los Cuerpos Legislativos de
la República de Chile, Vols. XXII-XXXVII, Santiago, Imprenta Cervantes, 1887-1908; Chile,
Congreso Nacional, Sesiones del Congreso Nacional (1846-1864); Chile, Congreso Nacional, Cámara
de Diputados, Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados (1865-1924), and Chile, Congreso Nacional,
Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores (1865-1924).
Year House Senate
1834 83 100
1835 40 38
1836 29 37
1837 6 4
1838 … …
1839 23 36
1840 48 22
1841 53 18
1842 76 35
1843 107 19
1844 113 20
1845 85 16
1846 53 15
1847 62 10
1848 58 28
1849 42 10
1850 72 12
1851 10 14
1852 57 12
1853 35 10
1854 86 13
1855 n/a n/a
1856 60 8
1857 48 2
1858 68 14
1859 42 9
1860 55 9
1861 41 6
1862 60 2
1863 102 3
1864 124 10
1865 68 15
1866 30 16
1867 20 14
1868 76 11
1869 76 13
1870 81 18
1871 64 14
1872 51 28
1873 76 35
1874 68 16
1875 120 22
1876 50 20
1877 82 21
1878 37 21
1879 59 9
1880 92 15
1881 107 11
1882 73 17
1883 101 14
1884 78 29
1885 95 6
1886 85 14
1887 134 23
1888 123 21
1889 70 32
1890 n/a n/a
1891 47 20
1892 182 33
1893 89 39
1894 129 24
1895 76 16
1896 77 43
1897 217 200
1898 165 63
1899 174 188
1900 n/a n/a
1901 183 92
1902 139 140
1903 122 71
1904 135 139
1905 176 122
1906 111 55
1907 n/a n/a
1908 n/a n/a
1909 255 160
1910 371 375
1911 202 349
1912 464 n/a
1913 211 n/a
1914 n/a n/a
1915 n/a n/a
1916 n/a n/a
1917 n/a n/a
1918 199 n/a
1919 200 n/a
1920 176 n/a
1921 n/a n/a
1922 n/a n/a
1923 n/a n/a
1924 n/a n/a
Year House Senate Year House Senate
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Sometimes it was the other way around, that is, either the House Speaker or the
Senate President informed the floor on the lack of committee activity, so he
recommended committee members to report to the floor. In any case, congressional
leaders merely recommended, but they did not imply punishment to enforce their
recommendations.
In this regard, congressional journals are filled with petitions and exhortations
addressed to committees. Indeed, the reluctance of a committee drove a desperate
House Speaker to claim in 1845: “there is almost nothing to deal with; because the
businesses that concern us today, whether introduced by the executive or
forwarded by the Senate, shall conclude in two or three more sessions”80.
Eventually, a House parliamentary practice developed in the 1860s to have
members’ petty projects voted by the floor in these circumstances, but this
practice did not affect the core of committee authority. Thus, members could
request from the House Speaker, during the incidents hour, to ask committees to
return legislation to the floor for a vote, for which purpose lack of committee
activity due to an incomplete membership became a plausible argument.
Nevertheless, the final word was in the hands of committees, which could turn
down the House Speaker request either by asking for the integration of the
committee or by doing business as usual.
As a matter of fact, a cursory review of congressional journals shows that doing
business as usual was not a far-fetched option, e.g. Deputy Cuadra asked the House
Speaker to recommend the Joint Committee on Budget to report on the account of
the investment of public funds of previous years on October 10th, 1876; Deputy
González asked the House Speaker to recommend the Committee on Government
and Foreign Affairs to report on a bill about the pavement of the streets of Curicó
on October 13th, 1877, and Senate President Covarrubias urged committee
members to report on the bills included in the presidential summon to
extraordinary sessions on October 29th, 1877, among others81.
Committees met no deadlines to report to the floor, other than deadlines that
aroused from either constitutional requirements or budgetary requirements. Indeed,
regarding bills that supplemented the current budget law during the discussion of the
annual budget law, congressional committees stretched out timelines as much as they
could after 1880, just as the balance between Congress and the Presidency changed.
Committees promptly reported on majority-supported legislation. Committees
issued written reports most of the time; exceptionally, they appointed one of their
members to deliver an oral report before the floor, when they did not have time to
put their report into written82. If one or more committee members disagreed with
80 SCD 6 Ord. (6/18/1845), in SCL 36: 53.
81 SCD 2 Ext. (10/10/1876):17; SCD 53 Ord. (10/13/1877): 705; SCS 1 Ext. (10/29/1877): 2.
82 See, among others, SCD 23 Ext. (3/22/1864), oral report of the House Select Committee on
the Complaints addressed to the President of the Republic about Freedom of Suffrage; SCD 22 Ext.
(10/17/1874), oral report of the House Select Committee on the Mining Law Code; SCS 24 Ord. (1/13/
1892), oral report of the Joint Select Committee on Elections to the Committee on Recess; SCS 36
Ext. (12/6/1892), oral report of the Senate Standing Committee on Legislation and Justice about
elections in the district of Nascimiento.
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respect to the committee report, then they issued at the same time a minority
report83. In so doing, committee reports gradually changed from brief documents
that supported a piece of legislation in the early 1830s to extensive documents that
dealt with the considerations entertained by committee members to support, amend
or reject a piece of legislation later.
Legislation that did not please most members –usually introduced by opposition
members, met an uncertain future in committees, because committee leaders had
considerable leeway to keep legislation in the dockets. In addition, shortage of
committee staff delayed committee work by the early twentieth century, straining
thus further the capability of committees to process incoming legislation84. By the
same token, multiple committee appointments caused either bottlenecks or delays
in the legislative process85, as evinced in the following reply by Deputy Huneeus
to a recommendation of the House Speaker to report on legislation, in 1878, as
follows:
“Mr. Huneeus.- The committee work overwhelm us. Precisely, Mr. Fabres, Mr. Gandari-
llas, Mr. Zegers, and I are members of the Reviewing Committee on the Mining Law
Code.… Materially speaking, we do not have time to discuss the different businesses
pending before our consideration”86.
Likewise, some committees had more to do than others. House Speaker Matta
recognized it in 1876, as follows: “There are committees that maybe, throughout
the time I have spent in this House, have not issued more than three reports, and
others have had to issue in each session up to twenty, thirty or more reports”87.
The result was always the same: disfavoured legislation either died or lagged in
committees88.
Congressional journals provide plenty of evidence on this end result. On June
15th, 1876 House Secretary and Deputy Blanco proposed a parliamentary
resolution (acuerdo) that authorized House committees to file documentation and
petitions that ought to be postponed indefinitely or which processing was
unnecessary. The House Secretary informed members that there were one-
hundred or more documents in that situation since 1830 or 1833 and,
furthermore, that the Secretariat compiled eight volumes of approximately one-
83 Reglamento (1840): Article 39; Reglamento (1831): Article 32; Reglamento (1846): Article 38.
84 Senator Montt asked for the appointment of auxiliary committee staffers by August 1904,
precisely to keep up with committee work. SCS 26 Ord. (8/3/1904): 531-532.
85 Simultaneous floor and committee sessions disrupted proceedings by the early 1900s,
notwithstanding that a resolution passed on July, 7th, 1901 forbade them. The floor ratified this
resolution on August, 24th, 1904. SCD 58 Ord. (9/5/1903): 1,159; SCD 71 Ord. (9/29/1903): 1,444-
1,445; SCD 61 Ord. (8/24/1904): 1,241, 1,243-1,245.
86 SCD 21 Ord. (7/16/1878): 303.
87 SCD 2 Ord. (6/6/1876): 23.
88 The House still had 1,010 businesses pending before twenty standing and select committees by
June 1st, 1905. Chile, Congreso Nacional, Cámara de Diputados, Catálogo de los asuntos pendientes
en las comisiones de la Cámara de Diputados: Junio 1º de 1905, Santiago, Imprenta Nacional, 1905.
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thousand pages each in the last years, all of which were filed into the House
archives. The House passed this resolution the very same day89. Pursuant to this
resolution the House Committee on War and Navy filed eighteen petitions and
two bills into the House archives90, whereas the House Committee on Treasure
filed thirty-two petitions (introduced from 1848 to 1872) into the House
archives91. Moreover, Deputy Sanfuentes bitterly complained that “good ideas
die in committees”92 on July 16th, 1869, while Deputy Barros Luco introduced a
bill on income tax and pointed out that committee members prevented the
passage of similar legislation on December 12th, 187693. Furthermore, on July
15th, 1877 an exchange between Senator and then Secretary of Interior Lastarria
and House Speaker Matta confirmed the discretion of committee leaders to keep
legislation in their dockets, as follows:
“Mr. Lastarria.- Generally, committees file those bills that they consider unimportant or
that, in their judgement, are not urgent and can wait indefinitely …]
Speaker.- I understand that the different Committees have arranged their dockets and
filed into the House archive all those projects about which they believe they should not
report”94.
Last but not least, the inauguration of a 5,500 square meters legislative palace
in downtown Santiago, in 1876, designed precisely to host a variegated number of
congressional activities, confirmed the permanent place of committees in the
congressional institution as they had congressional facilities of their own for the
first time, without fear of being evicted by other congressional organs95.
The evidence offered so far confirms that committees and their chairs had a
lever to pull the strings in the legislative process. Committee chairs -and the
majority, had a great deal of leeway to report on legislation to the floor, in terms of
opportunity, convenience, merit, etc.96. The latter was reinforced by the need to
integrate committees every year, which made many committees to lag behind
schedule and caused bottlenecks in the legislative process.
Likewise, the evidence points to a pervasive aspect of congressional influence
on law-making throughout the period under study. The executive introduced few
89 SCD 6 Ord. (6/15/1875): 86.
90 SCD 19 Ord. (7/17/1875).
91 SCD 22 Ord. (7/24/1875).
92 SCD 12 Ord. (7/16/1869): 117.
93 SCD 26 Ext. (12/1/1876): 374.
94 SCD 16 Ord. (7/15/1876): 247.
95 Congress used the second floor of the legislative palace to hold the congressional library,
archives, and offices. Gonzalo Vial Correa et al., Historia del Senado de Chile, Santiago, Editorial
Andrés Bello, 1995, 72. Interestingly enough, the only executive office that functioned in this palace –
until the 1895 fire, was the Directorate of Public Works.
96 In a sense committee authority was another means –often overlooked, for congressional
obstructionism. On other means for congressional obstructionism, Gertrude Matyoka Yeager,
“Political Obstructionism in the Chilean Senate 1920-1924; A Study in Legislative Behavior”, Revista
de Historia de América 84, julio-diciembre 1977, 122-125.
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vetoes against legislation passed by Congress, but most public and private bills
spent a considerable time in Congress due to different reasons (structural
constraints of Congress, ideological disagreements in the ruling elite, economic
constraints on policy making, etc). Regardless frequent budget supplement laws,
private honorific bills, and war legislation, a perusal of congressional journals
shows that most bills that finally became law spent from one-and-one half to four
or more calendar years in Congress. Likewise, both public and private bills
underwent modifications in both houses’ committees frequently, notwithstanding
the electoral influence of the executive. Conversely, public or private bills
disfavoured by congressional elites had a hard time either to go beyond the
congressional leaders’ dockets or, if referred to committees, to emerge as a
committee report out of a committee docket. The House and Senate committee
reports on backlog and archives mentioned above constitute evidence on this
assertion.
CONCLUSION
This article showed that the Chilean legislature developed a congressional
committee system that took stock of previous experiences and remained untouched
until the late nineteenth century. In a sense, both houses locked-in into the
institutional design agreed upon early, so committee reforms built upon the
institutional framework passed in the 1840s. Interestingly enough, both houses’
committee systems reflected bureaucratic goals at first and newly emergent policy
issues by the turn of the century.
The committee appointment process emphasized the importance of floor
majority support and congressional leaders’ persuasion skills most of the time.
Otherwise congressional leaders risked turning committees into unworkable
agencies, which was detrimental for a smooth functioning of the legislature,
especially the House. The latter suggests the existence of a decentralized power
structure in both houses, which impacted negatively the authority of both the
House Speaker and the Senate President in the committee appointment process.
The dynamics of committee referral diverged in both houses due to the different
role played by committees in the legislative process therein. Institutional design
had an impact on both houses’ committee workloads. This factor justified their
different regulation of committee referral. Mandatory committee referral impacted
positively on House committee workload, while the suppression of mandatory
committee referral impacted negatively on Senate committee workload for quite a
while, regardless of the external environment of the legislature.
The evidence suggests that committees socialized members in the ins-and-outs
of the legislative and committee processes. In this respect, committees dealt with
different types of legislative inputs, such as bill drafting, congressional
housekeeping, and bureaucratic oversight. In so doing, committee leadership
exercised considerable authority by deciding either to report or not to report on
legislation to the floor. The latter implies that committees performed as
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specialized, authoritative congressional agencies throughout the time-span
analyzed herein.
Needless to say, the evidence also points to a committee institutionalization
process that took off before the emergence of modern political parties and even
under the autocratic, Conservative Republic that lasted until 1861. In so doing,
Chilean congressional committees largely preceded the parliamentary committees
of some contemporary Western polities, i. e. Italy and Portugal, as patterns of
committee behavior and norms achieved stability, permanency, and self-sustaining
status for most of the period of time analyzed herein, which contributed to
democratization in the long-run by making Congress a key decision-making
actor97. Interestingly enough, Chilean congressional committees reached this state
several decades later than American congressional committees, which became
leading decision-making actors in the US. House by 1814, but earlier than Britain’s
House parliamentary committees, usually displaced by the Committee of the
Whole in the legislative process98. More likely than not, the evolving institutional
design of the Chilean legislature had an impact on this outcome, as the Chilean
legislature gradually became an intermediate case between the US. Congress and
Britain’s House by the 1890s, a phenomenon that pushed it further above in the
path of institutionalization99.
97 Obando, op. cit.; Walter C. Opello, Jr., “Portugal’s Parliament: An Organizational Analysis of
Legislative Performance”, Legislative Studies Quarterly XI:3, 1986, 291-319; Vincent Della Sala,
“The permanent committees of the Italian Chamber of Deputies: Parliament at Work?”, Legislative
Studies Quarterly 18:2, 1993, 157-183; Robert Leonardi, Rafaella Nanetti and Gianfranco Pasquino,
“Institutionalization of Parliament and Parliamentarization of Parties in Italy”, Legislative Studies
Quarterly 3:1, 1978, 181.
98 Polsby, Nelson W., “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives”, The
American Political Science Review 62:1, 1968, 156; John R. Hibbing, “Legislative Institutionalization
with Illustrations from the British House of Commons”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 32:3, 1988, 697.
99 Obando, op. cit.; John R. Hibbing, “Legislative Careers: How and Why We Should Study
Them”, Legislative Studies Quarterly 24:2, 1999, 161.
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